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 The case of People v. Croswell1 will forever stand for the spirited arguments by leading 
legal minds about the legality of using truth as a defense to criminal libel, establishing the common 
law, and determining the role of the jury. But it is the story of Harry Croswell, young firebrand 
Federalist editor of The Wasp, that provides an insightful view into the turbulent political scene 
that stormed fiercely across the United States at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
I. HISTORICAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Political Turmoil and the Press 
 The great unity of the American Revolution quickly gave way to partisan discord as the 
fragile formation of the nation was threatened by intense political strife.2 With the nature of the 
new nation’s governance on the line, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist political parties stood 
diametrically opposed.3 Led by Alexander Hamilton, the Federalists staunchly believed in strong 
national government and broad federal powers. Conversely, Thomas Jefferson’s Anti-Federalists, 
also known as Democratic-Republicans, Republicans, or Jeffersonians, steadfastly believed in 
state’s rights and limited national government.4 
 Spurred on by Jefferson, Republican editors began waging a war of words against the 
Federalists after Jefferson had openly complained that George Washington’s presidency was 
“galloping fast into monarchy” while a member of Washington’s cabinet.5 Lambasting Federalist 
 
1 People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804).  
2 Paul McGrath, People v. Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the Transformation of the 
Common Law of Libel, 7 JUD. NOTICE 5 (2011).  
3 McGrath, supra note 2, at 6. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
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principles in print, the Republican press also began to criticize the character of prominent  
Federalists, including President John Adams and Alexander Hamilton.6 
 Scottish-born James T. Callender was one of the inflammatory Republican editors of the 
time.7 In a pamphlet called The Prospect Before Us, Callender wrote that “Mr. Washington has 
been twice a traitor” and that John Adams was a “hoary headed incendiary.”8 Reporting in the 
Richmond Examiner, Callender also savagely attacked the character of leading Federalists, and 
was the first to expose Alexander Hamilton’s affair to the public.9 Callender’s actions reflected the 
goal of the Republican press: to deflate and discredit the Federalist party, both ideologically and 
individually.10  
 The ruling Federalist party did not take the Republicans’ insulting and derogatory 
mudslinging lightly.11 In response to the contemptuous press, the Federalist-dominated 
government passed the Sedition Acts of 1798.12 Specifically, the Sedition Act made it a crime for 
anyone to publicly criticize the President or any other government official, and the punishment 
was a severe fine and up to two years in prison.13  
 
6 Id. President Washington had already become canonized in the public eye by this time, so the 
republicans focused on other federalists such as Adams and Hamilton. Id.  
7 McGrath, supra note 2, at 6; THOMAS FLEMING, JEFFERSON VERSUS HAMILTON 4 (2017) 
(eBook). 
8 McGrath, supra note 2, at 6. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 7. 
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 Attempting to quiet the rancorous Republican press, Federalists indicted dozens of 
Jeffersonian editors under the Sedition Act, convicting Callender, Charles Holt, and a few others.14  
 The sedition trials generated great political animosity.15 Claiming that the Federalists were 
destroying the First Amendment right to a free press, the Jeffersonians were outraged at the broad 
assertion of federal power that the Adams Administration had assumed in passing the Sedition 
Act.16 Legislators in Virginia and Kentucky went as far as to pass a resolution to the effect that the 
Sedition Act did not have authority in their states.17 With well over a hundred indictments pending, 
the Adams Administration abandoned the sedition trials after a mere ten convictions.18  
 Stopping these prosecutions did not remove the issue of free press from the public mind, 
however, and the political uproar caused by the sedition trials largely defeated the Federalists in 
the next presidential election, as Thomas Jefferson won the presidency in the election of 1800.19 
 Out of power, the Federalists began utilizing the press to fight back against the 
Jeffersonians.20 Federalist newspapers across the country took up the charge, including the 
Philadelphia Port Folio, Baltimore Anti-Democrat, and South Carolina Charlestown Courier.21 In 
New York City, Alexander Hamilton and a wealthy group of Federalists sponsored the New York 
 
14 Fleming, supra note 7, at 4; Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Croswell’s Case, 33 
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 418 (1965); 1 JULIUS GOEBEL JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 776 (1964). 
15 Goebel, supra note 14, at 775.  
16 Fleming, supra note 7, at 4. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 McGrath, supra note 2, at 7; Fleming, supra note 7, at 4. 
20 McGrath, supra note 2, at 7. 
21 Fleming, supra note 7, at 5. 
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Evening Post, with publisher William Coleman receiving his editorial material directly from 
Hamilton.22  
 Writing with particular vengeance was James Callender.23 Pleased by his role in Jefferson’s 
victory, Callender had asked Jefferson to be installed as the Federal Postmaster for Richmond, 
Virginia, but was denied.24 In true unsavory form, Callender, who as a loyal Jeffersonian had gone 
to jail because of his writings against the Federalists, now began to disparage Jefferson in print.25   
 Callender began publishing damaging stories about Jefferson’s public and private actions 
in the Richmond Recorder.26 His personal attacks on Jefferson included the ‘vitriolic prose’ about 
Jefferson’s fathering children with his slave, Sally Hemings, and a ‘juicy tale’ about Jefferson 
attempting to seduce the wife of a close friend, Mrs. John Walker.27 
 Publicly attacking Jefferson’s allegiance to George Washington, Callender revealed that 
Jefferson had paid Callender $100 to belittle Washington in Callender’s pamphlet The Prospect 
Before Us to sway public opinion.28 Admitting to paying Callender the $100, Jefferson claimed 
that the money was a charitable contribution towards Callender’s legal fees associated with his 
ongoing prosecution.29   
 
22 Fleming, supra note 7, at 5. The Evening Post is still in business today as The New York Post. 
Id. 
23 McGrath, supra note 2, at 7. 
24 Fleming, supra note 7, at 5. 
25 McGrath, supra note 2, at 7. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 McGrath, supra note 2, at 7–8.  
29 Id. at 8. 
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 News of Callender’s accusations about Jefferson’s loyalty and Jefferson’s attempted 
justification spread like wildfire amongst the Federalist publishers.30 Fanning the flames in 
Hudson, New York was Harry Croswell.31  
B. The Wasp and The Bee 
 Hudson, New York was a bustling, thriving, and popular city at the turn of nineteenth 
century, serving as the shipping center for western Massachusetts and northern Connecticut.32 
Nestled alongside the Hudson River, and only 28 miles downriver from the state capital in Albany, 
Hudson and the surrounding Columbia County were entrenched with Republicans and 
Federalists.33 So was the press.34  
 The moderate Federalist newspaper in Hudson at the time was called The Balance and 
Columbian Repository.35 To counter The Balance’s influence, local Jeffersonians brought in 
Republican editor Charles Holt.36 A hero of the press for the Jeffersonians, Holt had spent several 
months in jail after being convicted of libeling Alexander Hamilton in Holt’s New London Bee in 
April of 1800, and came to Hudson to reestablish The Bee.37 
 In open hostility to The Bee, Harry Croswell began publishing The Wasp under the name 
“Robert Rusticoat” on July 7, 1802.38 Not mincing words in explaining the purpose of his four-
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. Harry Croswell developed his political philosophy while studying at the home of Noah 
Webster, an old school Federalist, at a young age. Fleming, supra note 7, at 5. 
32 Fleming, supra note 7, at 5. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Fleming, supra note 7, at 5; McGrath, supra note 2, at 8. Croswell was a junior editor for The 
Balance, starting in that position at the age of 22. Fleming, supra note 7, at 5.  
36 Fleming, supra note 7, at 5; Goebel, supra note 14, at 776.  
37 Forkosch, supra note 14, at 418; Fleming, supra note 7, at 5; Goebel, supra note 14, at 776.  
38 Goebel, supra note 14, at 776. 
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page Wasp, which carried the phrase “to lash the rascals naked throughout the world” as its 
masthead,39 Croswell’s opening issue declared:  
Wherever the Bee ranges, the Wasp will follow over the same fields and the same 
flowers. Without attempting to please his friends, the Wasp will only strive to 
displease, vex and torment his enemies . . . The Wasp has a dirty and disagreeable 
job to perform. He has undertaken the chastisement of a set of fellows who are 
entrenched in filth—who like lazy swine are wallowing in a puddle. He must 
therefore wade knee-deep in smut before he can meet his enemies on their ground.40 
 
And that’s what Croswell’s Wasp did, attacking members of the Republican Party from President 
Jefferson down to the local sheriff and editor Holt.41 
 Croswell got right to work in No. 4 of The Wasp publishing, on August 12, 1802, an article 
called “A Few ‘Squally’ Facts.”42 The article attacked Jefferson’s record before becoming 
president and listed five counts of Jefferson’s actions that did not comport with the Constitution, 
ending as follows:  
It would be an endless task to enumerate the many acts, in direct hostility to 
common sense and the constitution, of which the “man of the people” has been 
guilty. These are facts, and I now ask his friends and foes—every American—do 
you not blush, for your country and your President?—Do you not in all this plainly 
perceive the little arts—the very little arts, of a very little mind—“Alas! What will 
the world think of the fold if such is the shepherd.”43 
 
 While the Federalist press was spreading James Callender’s accusations against Jefferson’s 
allegiance to Washington like wildfire during the summer of 1802, the Republican press was trying 
to douse the flames with Jefferson’s explanation.44 Charles Holt’s Bee published an article entitled 
 
39 McGrath, supra note 2, at 8. 
40 Goebel, supra note 14, at 776; Fleming, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
41 Goebel, supra note 14, at 776. 
42 Id. (citing The Wasp). 
43 Id. at 777 n.8.  
44 Goebel, supra note 14, at 778 n.13; McGrath, supra note 2, at 8. 
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“Mr. Jefferson’s Charity to Callender” on August 17, 1802 explaining Jefferson’s actions.45 This 
article in The Bee incensed Croswell and Croswell published a stinging response:46 
[I]t amounts to this then. He [Jefferson] read the book [The Prospect Before Us] 
and from that book inferred that Callender was an object of charity. Why! One who 
presented a face bloated with vices, a heart black as hell—one who could be guilty 
of such foul falsehoods, such vile aspersions of the best and greatest man the world 
has yet known--he is an object of charity! No! He is the very man, that an aspiring 
mean and hallow hypocrite would press into the service of crime. He is precisely 
qualified to become a tool—to spit the venom and scatter the malicious, poisonous 
slanders of his employer. He, in short, is the very man that a disassembling patriot, 
pretended ‘man of the people’ would employ to plunge for him the dagger or 
administer the arsenic.47 
 
 Croswell followed up his savage attack on Jefferson’s explanation of payments to 
Callender with: “Will the reader turn to that inaugural speech of 1801 and see how this incarnate 
[Jefferson] speaks of Washington. There he makes him a demigod—having already paid Callender 
for making him a devil . . . . Will the word hypocrite describe this man? There is not strength 
enough in the term.”48 
 Holt’s Bee retorted by disparaging Callender’s character.49 A furious Croswell then turned 
on Holt:  
About the time of Callender’s trial, you [Holt] printed a paper in New London–in 
that paper Callender was extolled to the skies. He was then an ‘excellent 
Republican,’ a ‘virtuous man,’ a ‘good citizen,’ a ‘suffering patriot.’ . . . if there is 
anything on earth to be pitted, it is a miserable editor constantly tumbling into the 
mire; and whose every struggle but sinks him deeper.50 
 
 
45 Goebel, supra note 14, at 778. 
46 Id.  
47 McGrath, supra note 2, at 8; Goebel, supra note 14, at 778 (quoting The Wasp). 
48 Fleming, supra note 7, at 6. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (quoting The Wasp). 
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Croswell’s stinging editorials continued in No. 7 of The Wasp, on September 9, 1802:  
Holt says, the burden of the Federal song is, that Mr. Jefferson paid Callender for 
writing against the late administration. This is wholly false. The charge is explicitly 
this: Jefferson paid Callender for calling Washington a traitor, a robber, and a 
perjurer; For calling Adams, a hoary headed incendiary; and for most grossly 
slandering the private characters of men, who he well knew were virtuous. These 
charges, not a democratic editor has yet dared, or ever will dare to meet in an open 
[and] manly discussion.51 
 
 Croswell next turned his political ire on local Jeffersonians, targeting New York Attorney 
General Ambrose Spencer of Columbia County with a nasty poem in the September 9, 1802 issue 
of The Wasp after Spencer, a one-time Federalist, had defected to Jefferson’s camp: 
Th’ attorney general chanc’d one day to meet  
a dirty, ragged fellow in the street  
A noisy swaggering beast  
with rum half drunk at least  
Th’ attorney, too, was drunk— 
but not with grog,  
Power and pride had set his head agog.52 
 
 Worried about the effect of the Federalist press on his chances for reelection in 1804, 
Jefferson sent word to prominent and influential Republicans to pressure the press by prosecuting 
a few Federalist editors.53 Jefferson’s letter to New York Governor George Clinton encouraged 
“prosecutions of the most prominent offenders . . . not a general prosecution, for that would look 
like a persecution; but a selected one.”54  
 
51 Goebel, supra note 14, at 777 n.9.  
52 McGrath, supra note 2, at 8; Fleming, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
53 Fleming, supra note 7, at 7; Peter Hess, The Albany Connections of Burr, Hamilton, and 
Schuyler, The NEW YORK HISTORY BLOG (May 14, 2015), 
https://newyorkhistoryblog.org/2015/05/the-albany-connections-of-burr-hamilton-and-schuyler/. 
54 Fleming, supra note 7, at 7; Hess, supra note 53 (quoting Jefferson’s letter to Gov. Clinton).   
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 Republican prosecutors got right to work, charging Joseph Dennie, prominent Federalist 
editor of the Philadelphia Port Folio, with seditious libel.55 Smarting from the personal accusations 
against his character, Attorney General Spencer chose to prosecute Harry Croswell.56 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 Adopting Roman-era legal sources, the early English common law viewed defamation, 
libel, and slander as offending the public peace, and allowed civil and criminal actions for them, 
with an important distinction.57 Since public libels threatened the public peace regardless of their 
veracity, the truth of the libel was not allowed to be presented into evidence as justification in 
criminal prosecutions.58 Civil libel actions, however, which were more private in nature, did allow 
the defendant to justify the libel by presenting evidence of the truth of the charge.59 
 The earliest recorded seditious libel cases came from the Court of Star Chamber in 1606.60 
Housed in Westminster Palace, the Star Chamber protected the sovereign from breaches of the 
peace and insurrection by trying seditious libel and treason cases.61 Promulgating the apparent 
common law rule, the Star Chamber considered any disparaging statement to be seditious libel 
regardless of its truthfulness.62  
 
55 Fleming, supra note 7, at 7. 
56 Id. at 7–8.  
57 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 25 (12th and 13th ed. 1884) [hereinafter 
KENT’S COMMENTARIES]. 
58 KENT’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 57, at 25.  
59 KENT’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 57, at 25; Elizabeth Samson, The Burden to Prove Libel: 
A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and U.S. Defamation Laws and the Dawn of 
England’s Modern Day, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 771, 779 (2012).  
60 Samson, supra note 59, at 777.  
61 Samson, supra note 59, at 778 n.39.  
62 KENT’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 57, at 25; Samson, supra note 59, at 778. 
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 Parliament abolished the Star Chamber in 1641 after the Star Chamber became notorious 
for ruling in favor of Charles I.63 Yet, despite changes to the English political system, the criminal 
law of libel established by the Star Chamber remained.64 Substantively, the truth was inadmissible 
as a defense to seditious libel and it was up to the judge to decide if an item was libelous.65 
Jurisprudentially, however, the jury still had an important role in criminal libel cases.66 While all 
that was technically left for the jury to decide was whether the defendant had published the libel, 
the jury was allowed to disregard the judge’s instructions and find the defendant not guilty on the 
whole.67  
 In the American colonies, which followed the English common law, Zenger’s case 
presented an important development in criminal libel law.68 In colonial court on August 4, 1735, 
John Peter Zenger was charged with seditious libel for criticizing colonial governor William Cosby 
in Zenger’s New York Weekly Journal.69 Andrew Hamilton defended Zenger, strenuously arguing 
against the English common law.70 Instructing the jury in accordance with the English common 
law, Chief Justice Delancey did not allow the truth to be asserted as a defense and asked the jury 
to decide if Zenger had published the material but not to give a general verdict.71 Responding to 
 
63 Samson, supra note 59, at 778. 
64 Id. 
65 Bernard L. Sheintag, The Struggle for a Free Press, 17 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL. 62, 63 (1945). 
Interestingly, the truth of the matter was admissible for sentencing. Id.  
66 Sheintag, supra note 65, at 63.  
67 Id.  
68 Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64; Samson, supra note 59, at 780; Eugene Volokh, Freedom for 
the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 459, 485 (2012). 
69 Samson, supra note 59, at 779; Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64. 
70 Samson, supra note 59, at 779. Andrew Hamilton is not related to Alexander Hamilton. 
Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64.  
71 Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64.  
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Andrew Hamilton’s stirring closing argument, the jury disregarded their instructions and found 
Zenger not guilty, much to popular delight.72 
 Back in England, the Dean of St. Asaph’s case, Rex v. Shipley, challenged the common law 
rule in 1784.73 William Shipley, the Dean of St. Asaph’s cathedral, was charged with seditious 
libel for reprinting a pamphlet.74 Thomas Erskine, one of the leading barristers of the time, 
defended Shipley.75 Referencing Zenger, Erskine argued that the jury should determine whether 
the pamphlet was libelous and not the judge.76 Rejecting Erskine’s arguments in favor of the 
established common law, Lord Mansfield and the other judges on the King’s Bench ruled on the 
libelous implications of the pamphlet and found Shipley guilty.77  
 The St. Asaph case led to convincing popular condemnation of the common law doctrine, 
spearheaded by Erskine and leading statesman.78 Against the opposition of Lord Mansfield’s court 
and many lawyers, Fox’s libel act—“An Act to Remove Doubts with Respect to the Functions of 
Juries in Cases of Libel”—passed Parliament in 1792.79 The Act gave the jury the right to decide 
a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, instead of just deciding on the publication, but did not 
address whether the truth or justifiable motives could be used as a defense.80 
 The enshrinement of the freedoms of speech and the press in the Bill of Rights in 1791 did 
not stop the young American Congress from passing the Sedition Act in 1798, criminalizing public 
 
72 Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64; Samson, supra note 59, at 780.  
73 Volokh, supra note 68, at 485. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 485 n.100.  
77 Volokh, supra note 68, at 485. 
78 Sheintag, supra note 65, at 63–64. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
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criticism of government officials.81 Importantly, the Sedition Act expressly gave the jury the right 
to return a general verdict and allowed the truth to be admissible as a defense.82  
 The abuse of and the countering attack on the Sedition Act by both political parties, 
however, cast a dark cloud over the legality of the Sedition Act, leaving the American common 
law of criminal libel in flux.83  
III. THE CASE 
A. The Trial   
 The local Republican sheriff was sent to summon an all-Republican jury, and Croswell was 
indicted on two counts of seditious libel on January 10, 1803.84 The next day, Croswell appeared 
in front of the three Republican judges of the local Court of General Sessions of the Peace for 
Columbia County in Claverack, New York.85  
 Attorney General Spencer led Croswell’s prosecution, assisted by local Columbia County 
District Attorney Ebenezer Foote.86 Spencer’s appearance as the lead prosecutor in a local inferior 
court was unusual for the Attorney General, but not without explanation.87 Spencer had started his 
career in Hudson, and Columbia County was Spencer’s political stronghold after switching his 
political allegiances to join the Republican party in 1798.88  
 
81 Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64; Samson, supra note 59, at 779; McGrath, supra note 2, at 6–7.  
82 McGrath, supra note 2, at 6–7; Sheintag, supra note 65, at 64.  
83 KATE E. BROWN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW 204 
(2017). 
84 Forkosch, supra note 14, at 418; Goebel, supra note 14, at 779. 
85 Forkosch, supra note 14, at 418; Goebel, supra note 14, at 779.  
86 McGrath, supra note 2, at 8. 
87 Goebel, supra note 14, at 779. 
88 Id.  
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 Not surprisingly, the Federalists despised Spencer for what they viewed as nothing short 
of treason, and Croswell had expressed the Federalist frustrations with Spencer by penning a 
piercing poem about the Attorney General’s political loyalties.89 Spencer’s intentional choice to 
personally prosecute Croswell, an obscure upstate printer, as opposed to more prominent and 
influential Federalist editors in New York, and Spencer’s relentless prosecutorial tactics 
throughout the proceedings, show the extent of Spencer’s personal animosity towards Croswell.90 
 Croswell’s first indictment was based on Croswell’s “A Few ‘Squally’ Facts” about 
Jefferson.91 The second and more important charge was for seditious libel for Croswell’s editorial 
about the Jefferson-Callender scandal.92 
 Leading Federalist lawyers rushed to Croswell’s defense from near and far, including 
Elisha Williams, Jacob Rutsen Van Rensselaer, and William W. Van Ness.93 The young and 
brilliant Van Ness from Columbia County was renowned for his friendly courtroom manner, often 
asking the jury foreman for a chew of tobacco during his arguments.94 
 Several rounds of preliminary motions commenced.95 Croswell’s counsel demanded copies 
of the indictments and requested a postponement of the trial until the next time a supreme court 
justice would be in Claverack on circuit due to the complexity of the case.96 Spencer objected to 
both motions, and both were denied.97 
 
89 Id. See supra text at note 52. 
90 Id. See infra text at notes 187–89. 
91 McGrath, supra note 2, at 8. This indictment was never pursued at trial and was only briefly 
mentioned in the local press. Id.  
92 Id. See text accompanying notes 45–48.  
93 McGrath, supra note 2, at 9; Fleming, supra note 7, at 8.  
94 Fleming, supra note 7, at 8. 
95 McGrath, supra note 2, at 9. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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  Uncovering the crux of the case, the defense next motioned to postpone the trial so that 
they could bring in James Callender to testify that the supposed libel was true.98 Spencer 
strenuously objected to the postponement, claiming that Callender’s testimony was not relevant, 
as the common law of New York followed the established English common law that truth was not 
admissible in a criminal libel case.99 In Spencer’s view, all that the state had to prove was that 
Croswell published the statements and that the statements defamed Jefferson.100 Countering for 
Croswell, Williams argued that the constitutional nature of ‘the people as sovereign’ demanded 
that the people be allowed to publish the truth in order to control the people’s government.101 But 
the motion was denied.102 
 The trial was eventually postponed to the next circuit by agreement of the parties after 
Croswell filed an affidavit that he expected to be able to prove the truth of the second charge.103 
Still fighting, Spencer attempted to set bail for the exorbitant sum of $500, but the court denied 
the request, agreeing with Croswell’s counsel that it would be an unlawful restriction of the press 
to do so.104 
 The trial began in the Circuit Court for Columbia County on July 11, 1803, with the Chief 
Judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Morgan Lewis, a Republican, presiding.105 Renewing 
the legal debate, the defense motioned to postpone the trial to bring Callender to testify, either in 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 McGrath, supra note 2, at 9. 
101 Id. at 10. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 McGrath, supra note 2, at 11; Forkosch, supra note 14, at 418. 
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person or by affidavit.106 The Chief Judge denied the motion, unequivocally stating that the law 
seemed settled that the truth was inadmissible as evidence.107   
 The trial proceeded without fanfare.108 Croswell admitted to publishing the issue of The 
Wasp and Chief Judge Lewis, having already announced his view of the law, instructed the jury to 
decide if Croswell had published the material and whether the article was defamatory.109 Retiring 
at sunset with almost nothing to debate, the jurors were out the whole night and returned at eight 
o’clock the next morning with the verdict: guilty.110 
B. The Appeal 
 Before the judgment could be pronounced, Croswell’s counsel moved for a new trial, 
arguing that the truth should have been admitted into evidence and that the court had misdirected 
the jury.111 The motion for new trial would be heard in front of the entire Supreme Court of 
Judicature sitting in Albany, with arguments eventually taking place on February 13 and 14, 
1804.112 
 Enter Alexander Hamilton for the defense. Hamilton had played an advisory role during 
the trial but took over the case on appeal, dramatically changing the nature of the case.113 The 
highly political nature of Croswell’s case likely encouraged Hamilton to take the case, giving him 
 
106 McGrath, supra note 2, at 11. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. The jury may have been considering disregarding the judge’s instructions and finding 
Croswell innocent generally, as in the Zenger case. 
111 McGrath, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
112 Goebel, supra note 14, at 797; McGrath, supra note 2, at 12. 
113 Forkosch, supra note 14, at 418; McGrath, supra note 2, at 12. Federalists had tried to recruit 
Hamilton for the trial by asking Hamilton’s father-in-law, Philip Schuyler, to intercede in a letter 
on June 23, 1803. Hamilton could not make it for the trial but seemed to play an advisory role. 
McGrath, supra note 2, at 12. 
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a high profile chance to demonstrate his legal brilliance as a thinker and orator, further his 
constitutional views of freedom of the press, and regain some lost popularity for himself and the 
Federalist party at the expense of the Jeffersonians.114 And, possibly, Hamilton chose to represent 
Croswell because Croswell was on trial for libeling Holt, the same Holt who had been convicted 
in April of 1800 for libeling Hamilton in the New London Bee.115 
 To represent Croswell in Albany, Hamilton retained the services of William W. Van Ness, 
who had represented Croswell at trial, and recruited Richard Harrison, a former assistant attorney 
general during Washington’s administration and old friend of Hamilton, to join the cause.116  
 As oral argument approached,117 Spencer was elevated to the Supreme Court of Judicature, 
replacing the resigning Jacob Radcliff, but continued to argue the case for the State in front of his 
colleagues on the bench, alongside fellow Jeffersonian George Caines.118  
 Spencer arguing for the State, only four of the five members of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature heard Croswell’s case.119 Notwithstanding the fact that the court was reviewing his 
decision at the trial, Chief Judge Lewis sat alongside fellow Republicans Brockholst Livingston 
and Smith Thompson.120 James Kent was the only Federalist.121  
 
114 McGrath, supra note 2, at 12. 
115 Forkosch, supra note 14, at 418.  
116 McGrath, supra note 2, at 13.  
117 In an interesting development, the Federalists’ potential star witness James Callender died on 
July 17, 1803. Amid a drinking spree, Callender either fell or was pushed out of a boat during a 
scuffle and found a final resting place in ‘congenial mud’. This did not ruin the federalist’s case 
in the event of a new trial though because Callender’s papers had survived and could be used in 
evidence. McGrath, supra note 2, at 12; Sheintag, supra note 65, at 62. 
118 McGrath, supra note 2, at 13; Goebel, supra note 14, at 793 n.60.  
119 McGrath, supra note 2, at 13. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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 Oral argument lasted two days.122 Opening for the defense, Van Ness peppered the bench 
with ancient sources, showing that truth had always been a defense to libel and that the truth 
defense was a necessary part of a free country’s elective system.123 Van Ness, and later Harrison, 
expounded on the jury’s right to decide on both the law and fact of a libel case, quoting the relevant 
Sedition Act provisions as declaratory of the common law.124 Croswell’s counsel continued to 
challenge the Dean of St. Asaph’s ruling with a historical argument that the common law of libel 
had been perverted by the Star Chamber.125 Because the prevailing practice was that the parties 
did not exchange briefs before oral argument, Spencer and Caines were unprepared and unable to 
respond to Croswell’s historical arguments.126  
 Responding for the State, Caines’ argument mirrored the judge’s instructions to the jury in 
Zenger’s case, that the greater the truth the greater the libel, as well as that judges decide the law 
while juries decide the facts.127 Spencer commented that the defense had not attempted to bring 
Callender to testify at the trial with due diligence, and, more importantly, that the common law 
was settled that the truth could not be admitted into evidence.128 In this common law argument, 
Spencer insisted that the Sedition Act and Fox’s Libel Act, which both allowed the truth to be 
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123 Id. at 13–14. 
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the Star Chamber to prove the original common law rule that caught Spencer unaware. Spencer’s 
response was to ignore the ancient historical precedents, focusing instead on the Star Chamber’s 
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127 McGrath, supra note 2, at 14. 
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admitted in libel cases, were not declaratory of the common law, arguing that Croswell had 
violated the law as it was and not what it perhaps should be.129  
 With the conclusion of the other arguments, Hamilton rose to close as most of the members 
of the state senate and assembly packed into the courthouse.130 Hamilton’s masterful oratory was 
not the only draw for state legislators; a bill had recently been presented that would allow evidence 
of the truth to be presented in criminal libel cases.131 
 Presenting a slew of historical and modern precedents, Hamilton passionately argued that 
the common law demanded that the veracity of the libel be admitted into evidence as a defense, 
and gave the jury the right to determine the intent of the publication.132 Extolling the virtues of a 
free press as a check on free government, Hamilton insisted that the purpose of a free press was to 
allow the “publishing of truth with good motives;” but, the “pestilential doctrine of an unchecked 
press” was abhorrent to liberty.133 It was the jury’s role to provide that check on government and 
the press, not appointed judges.134 This line of argument led Hamilton to digress:  
[I]nto a pathetic, impassioned, and most eloquent address on the danger to our 
liberties, not from a few provisional armies, but from dependent judges[,] from 
selected juries, from stifling the press and the voice of leaders and patriots. We 
ought to resist—resist—resist til we hurl the demagogues and tyrants from their 
imagined thrones.135  
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 Turning back to Croswell’s case, Hamilton asserted that the nation had a right to know 
whether Jefferson had slandered Washington.136 A description of Washington’s noble character 
led Hamilton into a passionate eulogy of Washington that was “never surpassed, never equaled.”137 
Hamilton’s “sublimely eloquent”138 performance was “the greatest forensic effort he ever 
made.”139 After six hours of Hamilton’s dazzling oratory and two days of argument, the case was 
submitted.140 
IV. THE COURT’S DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS 
 The court split evenly—Judges Kent and Thompson agreed with the Croswell defense on 
both points, while Chief Judge Lewis and Judge Livingston did not agree with either—but not 
without the raging politics infiltrating the halls of judgment.141 Providing a behind the scene view 
of the deliberations, Judge Kent’s notes describe that the judges were initially aligned 3-1 to grant 
a new trial: Lewis, unsurprisingly, would not retract his steadfast opinion at the trial; Livingston 
wanted to quickly reverse on the jury instructions; and Kent, with Thompson in agreement,142 
sought to delay the decision to publish a more thorough opinion of both issues.143 
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 During the next term, Croswell began attending court daily to await his verdict.144 This 
continued until one day when Lewis was away on circuit, and Livingston agreeing with Kent and 
Thompson that a new trial was warranted, the judges released Croswell on bail and ordered him to 
appear for a new trial during the next circuit when their decision would be explained.145  
 Surprising his colleagues, Livingston switched his vote towards the end of the term with a 
brief explanation that he was satisfied by Chief Judge Lewis’ opinion.146 Kent believed that 
Republican pressure had caused Livingston to change his vote, and not the merits.147 
 The Chief Judge announced the divided court’s decision on the last day of the term.148 
Livingston did not appear in court that day, and apparently never took the time to read Kent’s 
opinion.149 At the bench, Kent wanted to announce his reasoning and read his opinion out loud, 
but Lewis demurred.150  
 Years later, court reporter William Johnson published the two opinions in 1812.151 Echoing 
Hamilton’s arguments, Kent’s opinion concluded that the jury should decide on the accuracy of 
the libel and that truth of the libel is admissible into evidence.152 Lewis’ opinion, predictably, 
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buttressed his decision at the trial, referencing many English cases to the extent that the veracity 
of the libel was irrelevant in criminal libel cases.153  
V. LEGAL IMPACT AND ANALYSIS 
 The Croswell arguments—whether the defendant could show evidence of the truth of the 
libel and whether the jury could determine the intent of the libel—reverberated throughout the 
Union, with different results.154  
 In the 1811 case of State v. Lehre, the South Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously held 
that a defendant did not have a right to submit evidence of the truth of the libel as a justification, 
reasoning that this was in accordance with the settled law of England, Europe, and most of 
America.155 Similarly, Massachusetts courts held that the well-grounded public policy of 
restraining breaches of the peace and preventing private animosity and revenge fortified the law 
that malicious libel was an offense regardless of the veracity of the libel.156 Louisiana courts, as 
well, declared that truth was inadmissible in criminal cases, although it may be used in civil 
cases.157 However, in 1827, the Massachusetts legislature passed an act that allowed the truth to 
 
on the trial, and that the truth is admissible in evidence, to explain that intent, and not in every 
instance to justify it.”). 
153 Id. (“Had the examination I have given this subject, eventuated in the conviction that I had 
mistaken, the law, I should, without hesitation, have renounced my error. The result being the 
reverse, and it being the duty of a judge to pronounce the law as he finds it, and to leave the 
alteration of it, when found inconvenient to that body to whom the constitution has confided the 
power of legislation, I am constrained to declare, I think the defendant not entitled to a new trial 
on either of the grounds on which his motion is rested.”). 
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be given into evidence in libel cases, but the truth of the matter would only be a justification if it 
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.158  
 Yet, at the same time, other states relied on Croswell, and a steady stream of cases, statutes, 
and state constitutions followed.159 
 Back in New York, a stalemate in court did not inhibit Croswell from having an immediate 
impact on the law of libel.160 Now a member of the state legislature, William W. Van Ness 
introduced a bill called the Libel Act which was enacted on April 15, 1805.161 The Libel Act 
incorporated Hamilton’s arguments and Kent’s opinion, allowing the truth to be given into 
evidence and the jury to determine the intent.162 Similar language was later formally written in to 
the New York State Constitution in 1821: “in all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth 
may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter charged as 
libellous, is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be 
acquitted.”163 
 Other state constitutions followed.164 The Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois state constitutions all include a provision that in cases of libel against 
public officials in public conduct truth can be given into evidence when it is proper public 
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information.165 Extending that right to allow the truth to be presented in all libel prosecutions, 
public and private, were New Jersey, Mississippi, and Missouri.166 And the Pennsylvania 
legislature expanded the constitutional protection, permitting evidence of the truth to be presented 
in all criminal libel cases.167 
A. Limitations on the Freedom of the Press  
 Expanding Croswell’s case past defamatory libel, Hamilton and Kent were able to lay a 
significant layer of foundation for the freedom of the press later embodied by the American 
people.168 Establishing the truth defense to criminal libel was a formal break from the English law, 
and eventually led to the New York Times v. Sullivan standard for libel—actual malice and reckless 
disregard for the truth.169  
 But has the freedom of the press gone too far? Hamilton and Kent, the orchestrators of the 
Croswell doctrine, emphatically emphasized that they were not proposing an unchecked press. 
Freedom of the press, in Hamilton’s view, allowed the “publishing of truth with good motives” 
but the “pestilential doctrine of an unchecked press” was destructive to liberty.170 Similarly, while 
explaining his reasoning for holding that the truth is admissible into evidence, Judge Kent 
proclaimed that:  
The founders of our governments were too wise and too just ever to have intended, 
by the freedom of the press, a right to circulate falsehood as well as truth, or that 
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the press should be the lawful vehicle of malicious defamation, or an engine for 
evil and designing men, to cherish, for mischievous purposes, sedition, irreligion, 
and impurity. Such an abuse of the press would be incompatible with the existence 
and good order of civil society.171  
 
True freedom of the press, rather, contains “the right to publish, with impunity, truth, with good 
motives, and for justifiable ends, whether it respects government, magistracy, or individuals.”172 
 Chastising the freedom-of-the-press trend towards “destroying every obstacle or 
responsibility in the way of the publication of the truth,”173 Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries 
on American Law, warns that: 
The subject is not without its difficulties, and it has been found embarrassing to 
preserve equally, and in just harmony and proportion, the protection which is due 
to character, and the protection which ought to be afforded to liberty of speech, and 
of the press. These rights are frequently brought into dangerous collision, and the 
tendency of measures in this country has been to relax too far the vigilance with 
which the common law surrounded and guarded character, while we are animated 
with a generous anxiety to maintain freedom of discussion.174 
 
In Kent’s view, the political and public policy choices surrounding the evolution of the freedom 
of speech doctrine reflected a societal change from revering good character to worshiping freedom 
of discussion at the expense of personal dignity.175  
B. Hamilton’s Impact on the Common Law 
 Besides impacting the law of libel, Hamilton’s arguments in Croswell had a powerful, yet 
subtle, impact on the American legal system, inconspicuously transforming the common law.176 
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Instead of just applying a strict series of rules and precedents, Hamilton’s common law argument 
in Croswell incorporated the entire English legal tradition.177 Using a broad legal tradition view of 
the common law, Hamilton was able to combine various laws and procedures from different times, 
jurisdictions, and institutions to prove his points.178 And prove them he did.  
 Without disrespecting traditional common law rights, Hamilton’s expansive view 
welcomed more discretion and diversity in applying the common law.179 For if the body of relevant 
legal material is much greater, then arguments that had not been previously supported by specific 
cases were now accessible.180 However, this was not without some danger, as encouraging a broad 
understanding of the common law allowed legal arguments to be tailor made to advocate for public 
policy choices or resist them, for better or for worse.181   
 Additionally, Hamilton’s treatment of the common law as a flexible framework of legal 
principles and precedents gave judges new authority to adopt, adapt, and declare substantive, non-
statutory law as common law.182 But this authority also contained a responsibility: to use the 
common law to protect American rights and liberties.183   
VI. AFTERMATH 
 Procedurally, with the court’s split, Croswell’s motion for a new trial was denied and the 
prosecutor could move for judgment.184 Perhaps recognizing that the legal battle was causing the 
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Republicans to lose the political war, no such motion was ever made.185 With the passage of the 
Libel Act of 1805, Croswell was unanimously granted a new trial but the prosecutor never 
attempted to retry him.186 
 Croswell’s legal troubles did not end there, though, as Spencer and Foote each brought 
civil libel actions against him for his publications, with Spencer obtaining a verdict of $126.187 
Foote, on the other hand, was accosted by a host of witnesses that testified that he was a swindler 
and cheated at cards while trying to prove the integrity of his character.188 Foote recovered 6 
cents.189 
 Croswell continued publishing his Federalist views in various papers, until, in 1811, a 
Federalist benefactor had Croswell thrown into debtors’ prison for not repaying his debts. 190 
Disgusted with politics, Croswell took Episcopalian orders and moved to Connecticut.191 He never 
discussed politics again.192  
 Days after announcing the decision in Croswell, Morgan Lewis entered the New York 
gubernatorial race, and won.193 Brockholst Livingston was elevated to the Supreme Court in 
1807;194 as was Smith Thompson; James Kent became the Chancellor of New York and later 
authored his acclaimed Commentaries on American Law after his retirement; Ambrose Spencer 
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assumed his seat on the Supreme Court of Judicature, later serving as chief judge; and William 
Van Ness, after a stint in the state assembly, joined the Supreme Court of Judicature as well.195 
 Hamilton’s involvement in Croswell led to his early death.196 While in Albany for the case, 
Hamilton made some withering remarks about Aaron Burr who was then running for governor of 
New York.197 Word slipped out, damaging Burr’s chance at the governorship.198 Furious, Burr 
eventually challenged Hamilton to a duel.199 And as the rocky heights of Weehawken were bathed 
in the early morning sun on July 11, 1804, Burr’s bullet ended Hamilton’s life.200 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The powerful blend of legal and political significance that People v. Croswell symbolizes 
is reflected in the opening lines of Chief Judge Lewis’ opinion: 
This cause has assumed an air of importance which I should be disposed to ascribe, 
in a great measure, to the spirit of the times, rather than to its intrinsic merits, did 
not the characters of the counsel who appear in support of the motion now under 
consideration preclude the idea. A printer, charged with a libelous and malicious 
publication, has called forth, in his defense, the gratuitous exertion of the choicest 
talents that grace this bar. This circumstance would impose a belief that questions 
of high importance are involved, and, under this impression, I have given them a 
careful examination.201  
 
 Hamilton and Kent fought valiantly for a freedom of the press that allowed publications 
with good motives for justifiable ends and not anything more sinister. Cleverly using Croswell as 
a springboard, Hamilton’s last large-scale public appearance catapulted the freedom of the press 
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forward while clandestinely changing the nature of the common law. And Kent leaves us with a 
warning: ‘the people’ must warily decide how far the freedom of the press can go and at what 
expense to personal dignity.  
 
